The Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact

Reprinted from the Communiqué of the Soviet Information Bureau, published in 1948, entitled "Falsifiers of History (Historical Information)"

Following the seizure of Czechoslovakia, fascist Germany proceeded with her preparations for war quite openly, before the eyes of the whole world. Hitler, encouraged by Britain and France, no longer stood on ceremony or pretended to favour a peaceful settlement of European problems. The most dramatic months of the pre-war period had come. At that time it was already clear that every day was bringing mankind nearer to an unparalleled catastrophic war.

What was the policy at that time of the Soviet Union on the one hand, and of Great Britain and France on the other?

The attempt of the American falsifiers of history to avoid answering this question merely goes to prove that their conscience is not clear.

The truth is that even in the fateful period of the spring and summer of 1939, on the threshold of war, Britain and France, supported by United States ruling circles, continued their former line of policy. This was a policy of maliciously inciting Hitler Germany against the Soviet Union camouflaged by pharisaical avowals of readiness to co-operate with the Soviet Union, as well as by certain simple diplomatic manoeuvres designed to conceal the real character of their policy from the world.

Of these manoeuvres the first were the negotiations which Britain and France decided to open with the Soviet Union in 1939. In order to deceive public opinion the ruling circles in Britain and France tried to create the impression that these negotiations were a serious attempt to prevent the further spread of Hitler aggression. In the light of the subsequent developments, however, it became perfectly clear that as far as the Anglo-French side was concerned these negotiations were from the very beginning nothing but another move in their double game.

This was also clear to the leaders of Hitler Germany, for whom the meaning of the negotiations with the Soviet Union undertaken by the Governments of Britain and France was certainly no secret. Here, as can be seen from documents captured by the Soviet Army at the time of Hitler Germany's defeat, is what the German Ambassador to London, Dirksen, wrote in his report to the German Foreign Ministry on August 3, 1939:

"The prevailing impression here was that [Britain's] ties with other states formed during the recent months were only a reserve means for a real reconciliation with Germany and that these ties would cease to exist as soon as the one important aim worthy of effort -- agreement with Germany -- was achieved."

This opinion was firmly shared by all German diplomats who watched the situation in London.

In another secret report to Berlin, Dirksen wrote:

"By means of armaments and the acquisition of allies, Britain wants to gain strength and catch up with the Axis, but at the same time she wants to try to reach an amicable agreement with Germany by means of negotiations." (Dirksen's memorandum: "On the Development of Political Relations Between Germany and Britain During My Term of Office in London," September 1939.)

The slanderers and falsifiers of history are trying to conceal these documents since they shed a vivid light on the situation which developed in the last pre-war months, without a correct assessment of which it is impossible to understand the true pre-history of the war. In undertaking negotiations with the Soviet Union and extending guarantees to Poland, Rumania and other states, Britain and France, with the support of U.S. ruling circles, were playing a double game, calculated to lead to an agreement with Hitler Germany with the aim of directing her aggression to the East, against the Soviet Union.

Negotiations Between Britain and France and the Soviet Union

Negotiations between Britain and France, on the one hand, and the Soviet Union, on the other, began in March 1939 and continued for about four months.

The whole course of these negotiations made it perfectly manifest that whereas the Soviet Union was striving to reach a broad agreement with the Western Powers, on a basis of equality, an agreement capable of preventing Germany, even if at the eleventh hour, from starting war in Europe, the Governments of Britain and France, backed by support in the United States, set themselves entirely different aims. The ruling circles of Britain and France, who were accustomed to having others pull the chestnuts out of the fire for them, on this occasion too attempted to inveigle the Soviet Union into assuming commitments under which it would have taken upon itself the brunt of the sacrifice in repulsing eventual Hitler aggression, while Britain and France would not be bound by any commitments toward the Soviet Union.

If the rulers of Britain and France had succeeded in this manoeuvre, they would have come much closer to attaining their major objective, which was to set Germany and the Soviet Union at loggerheads as quickly as possible. The Soviet Government, however, saw through the design, and at all stages of the negotiations countered the diplomatic trickery and subterfuges of the Western Powers with clear and frank proposals designed to serve but one purpose -- the safeguarding of peace in Europe.

There is no need to recount all the vicissitudes of the negotiations. We need only bring to mind a few of the more important points. Suffice it to recall the terms put forward in the negotiations by the Soviet Government: conclusion of an effective pact of mutual assistance against aggression between Britain, France and the U.S.S.R.; a guarantee by Britain, France and the U.S.S.R. to the states of Central and Eastern Europe, including all European countries bordering on the U.S.S.R. without exception; conclusion of a concrete military agreement between Britain, France and the U.S.S.R. on the forms and extent of immediate effective aid to each other and to the guaranteed states in the event of an attack by aggressors. (See Report by V.M. Molotov to the Third Session of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., May 31, 1939.)

A Position of Inequality for the U.S.S.R.

At the Third Session of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., on May 31, 1939, V.M. Molotov pointed out that some of the Anglo-French proposals made in the course of these negotiations contained none of the elementary principles of reciprocity and equality of obligations which are indispensable in all agreements between equals.

"While guaranteeing themselves," said V.M. Molotov, "from direct attack on the part of aggressors by mutual assistance pacts between themselves and with Poland, and while trying to secure themselves the assistance of the U.S.S.R. in the event of an attack by aggressors on Poland and Rumania, the British and French left open the question of whether the U.S.S.R. in its turn might count on their assistance in the event of its being directly attacked by aggressors, just as they left open another question, namely, whether they would be a party to guaranteeing the small states bordering on the U.S.S.R. and covering its northwestern frontiers, should these states prove unable to defend their neutrality from attack by aggressors. Thus the position was one of inequality for the U.S.S.R."

Even when the British and French representatives gave verbal assent to the principle of mutual assistance on terms of reciprocity between Britain, France and the U.S.S.R. in the event of a direct attack by an aggressor, they hedged it in with a number of reservations which rendered this assent fictitious.

In addition, the Anglo-French proposals provided for the rendering of assistance by the U.S.S.R. to those countries to which the British and French had given a promise of guarantees, but said nothing about themselves coming to the assistance of the countries on the northwestern frontier of the U.S.S.R., the Baltic States, in the event of an aggressor attacking them.

Taking into account these considerations, V.M. Molotov announced that the Soviet Union could not undertake commitments in respect of some countries unless similar guarantees were given in respect of the countries bordering on the northwestern frontiers of the Soviet Union.

It should also be remembered that when, on March 18, 1939, Seeds, the British Ambassador to Moscow, asked the People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs what the Soviet Union's position would be in the event of Hitler aggression against Rumania -- concerning the preparation for which the British were in possession of information -- and when the question was then raised by the Soviet side as to what Britain's position would be under those circumstances, Seeds evaded a reply with the remark that Rumania was geographically closer to the Soviet Union than it was to England.

No Obligations Whatever Towards the U.S.S.R.

It was thus quite clear from the very first that British ruling circles were endeavouring to bind the Soviet Union to definite commitments while standing aloof themselves. This artless device was repeated regularly again and again throughout the whole course of the negotiations.

In answer to the British inquiry, the Soviet Government suggested that a conference be called of representatives of the most interested states -- namely, Great Britain, France, Rumania, Poland, Turkey and the Soviet Union. In the opinion of the Soviet Government such a conference would offer the best opportunity to ascertain the real state of affairs and determine the position of each of the participants. The British Government, however, replied that it considered the Soviet proposal premature.

Instead of a conference, which would have made it possible to come to agreement on concrete measures to combat aggression, the British Government, on March 21, 1939, proposed that it and the Soviet Government, as well as France and Poland, should sign a declaration in which the signatory government would obligate themselves to "consult together as to what steps should be taken to offer joint resistance" in case of a threat to "the independence of any European state." In arguing that this proposal was acceptable, the British Ambassador laid particular emphasis on the point that the declaration was couched in very non-committal terms.

It was quite obvious that such a declaration could not serve as an effective means of averting the impending threat of aggression. Believing, however, that even so unpromising a declaration might constitute at least some step toward curbing the aggressor, the Soviet Government accepted the British proposal. But already on April 1, 1939, the British Ambassador in Moscow intimated that Britain considered the question of a joint declaration as having lapsed.

After two more weeks of procrastination of the British Foreign Secretary, Halifax, through the Ambassador in Moscow, made another proposal to the Soviet Government: namely, that it should issue a statement declaring that "in the event of an act of aggression against any European neighbour of the Soviet Union, who would offer resistance, the assistance of the Soviet Government could be counted upon if desired."

The underlying meaning of this proposal was that in the event of an act of aggression on the part of Germany against Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, or Finland, the Soviet Union would be obliged to render them assistance, without any commitment on the part of Britain to come to their aid. In other words, the Soviet Union was to go to war with Germany singlehanded. As to Poland and Rumania, whom Britain had given guarantees, the Soviet Union was to render assistance to them too against an aggressor. But even in their case Britain refused to assume any joint obligation with the Soviet Union, leaving herself a free hand and a field for any manoeuvre, not to mention the fact that, according to this proposal, Poland and Rumania, as well as the Baltic States, were to assume no obligations whatever toward the U.S.S.R.

The Soviet Proposal

The Soviet Government, however, did not want to miss a single opportunity to reach agreement with other powers for joint counteraction to Hitler aggression. Without the least delay it presented to the British Government its counter-proposal, which was: first, that the Soviet Union, Britain and France should mutually undertake to render one another every immediate assistance, including military, in the event of aggression against any one of them; secondly, that the Soviet Union, Britain and France should undertake to render every assistance, including military, to the states of Eastern Europe situated between the Baltic and the Black Sea and bordering on the Soviet Union in the event of aggression against these states; thirdly, that the Soviet Union, Britain and France should undertake to determine without delay the extent and forms of military assistance to be rendered to each of these states in both the above-mentioned cases.

Those were the most important points of the Soviet proposal. It will be easily seen that there was a fundamental difference between the Soviet and the British proposals, inasmuch as the Soviet proposal provided for really effective measures for joint counteraction to aggression.

For three weeks no reply to that proposal came from the British Government. This caused growing anxiety in Britain, owing to which the British Government felt constrained in the end to resort to a manoeuvre in order to deceive public opinion.

On May 8, the British reply, or, to be more exact, the British counter-proposals, were received in Moscow. It was again proposed that the Soviet Government should make a unilateral declaration in which it "would undertake that in the event of Great Britain and France being involved in hostilities in fulfilment of these obligations" (to Belgium, Poland, Rumania, Greece and Turkey) "the assistance of the Soviet Government would be immediately available if desired and be afforded in such manner and on such terms as might be agreed."

Once again the Soviet Union was expected to assume unilateral obligations. It was to commit itself to render assistance to Britain and France, while they assumed no obligations whatever toward the Soviet Union with regard to the Baltic Republics. Britain was thus proposing to put the U.S.S.R. in a position of inequality -- a position unacceptable to and incompatible with the dignity of any independent state.

It was easy to see that the British proposal was really addressed not so much to Moscow as to Berlin. The Germans were being invited to attack the Soviet Union, and were given to understand that Britain and France would remain neutral if only the Germans attacked through the Baltic States.

On May 11, the negotiations between the Soviet Union, Britain and France were still further complicated by a statement made by the Polish Ambassador in Moscow, Grzybowski, to the effect that "Poland does not regard it possible to conclude a pact of mutual assistance with the U.S.S.R...."

It goes without saying that a statement of this kind could only have been made by the Polish representative with the knowledge and approval of the ruling circles of Britain and France.

Spurring Hitler to Attack the U.S.S.R.

The behaviour of the British and French representatives in the Moscow negotiations was so provocative that even in the ruling camp of the Western Powers there were some who sharply criticized this crude game. Lloyd George, for one, severely took the makers of British policy to task in an article published in the French newspaper Ce Soir in the summer of 1939. There was only one reason, he said, for the endless procrastinations in the Anglo-French negotiations with the Soviet Union:

"Neville Chamberlain, Halifax and John Simon do not want any agreement with Russia what-ever."

It stands to reason that what was obvious to Lloyd George was no less obvious to the bosses of Hitler Germany. They understood perfectly well that the Western Powers had no serious intention of reaching agreement with the Soviet Union, but had an entirely different objective. It was to induce Hitler to speed his attack on the Soviet Union, offering him, as it were, a premium for doing so by placing the Soviet Union in the most unfavourable conditions in the event of a war with Germany.

Furthermore the Western Powers dragged out the negotiations with the Soviet Union endlessly, seeking to drown the major issues in a swamp of minor amendments and variants. Every time the question of real commitments arose, the representatives of these powers affected an air of perplexed misunderstanding.

Toward the end of May, Britain and France advanced fresh proposals, which somewhat improved their previous variant, but which still left open the essentially important question for the Soviet Union of guarantees for the three Baltic Republics bordering on the Soviet Union's northwestern frontier.

Thus the rulers of Britain and France, while making certain verbal concessions under the pressure of public opinion in their countries, stuck to their previous line and hedged in their proposals with reservations which they knew would make them unacceptable to the Soviet Union.

The behaviour of the British and French representatives in the negotiations in Moscow was so intolerable that V.M. Molotov was constrained, on May 27, 1939, to tell British Ambassador Seeds and French Charge d'Affaires Payart that their draft agreement for joint counteraction to an aggressor in Europe contained no plan for the organization of effective mutual assistance by the U.S.S.R., Britain and France, and that it did not even indicate that the British and the French Governments were seriously interested in concluding a pact to this effect with the Soviet Union. It was further plainly stated that the Anglo-French proposal created the impression that the Governments of Britain and France were not so much interested in a pact itself as in talk about a pact. It was possible that this talk was needed by Britain and France for purposes of their own. What these purposes were the Soviet Government did not know. But the Soviet Government was interested, not in talk about a pact, but in organizing effective mutual assistance by the U.S.S.R., Britain and France against aggression in Europe. The British and French representatives were warned that the Soviet Government did not intend to take part in pact talks of the purpose of which the U.S.S.R. had no knowledge, and that the British and French Governments might find more suitable partners for such talks than the U.S.S.R.

The Moscow negotiations dragged on endlessly. The London Times blurted out the reasons for this inadmissible procrastination when it wrote: "A hard and fast alliance with Russia would hamper other negotiations." (Sayers and Kahn: The Great Conspiracy: The Secret War Against Soviet Russia, Boston, 1946, p.329.) The Times was apparently referring to the negotiations which British Minister of Overseas Trade Robert Hudson was conducting with Hitler's economic adviser, Dr. Helmut Wohltat, on the possibility of a very substantial British loan to Hitler Germany, of which more anon.

Furthermore, it is known that on the day Hitler's army entered Prague the press reported that a delegation of the Federation of British Industries was negotiating in Dusseldorf for the conclusion of an extensive agreement with German big industry.

Another circumstance that could not help attracting attention was that, whereas the men who had been sent to Moscow to conduct the negotiations on behalf of Great Britain were officials of secondary rank, Chamberlain himself had gone to Germany to negotiate with Hitler, and moreover on several occasions. It is also important to note that Strang, the British representative in the negotiations with the U.S.S.R., had no authority to sign any agreement with the Soviet Union.

Military Negotiations Also Futile

In view of the Soviet Union's insistence that concrete measures to oppose a possible aggressor be discussed, the Governments of Britain and France were constrained to agree to dispatch military missions to Moscow. However, these missions took an extraordinarily long time getting to Moscow, and when they finally arrived it transpired that they were composed of men of secondary rank, who, furthermore, had not been authorized to sign any agreement. Under these circumstances, the military negotiations proved as sterile as the political ones.

The military missions of the Western Powers demonstrated from the first that they did not even desire to discuss measures of mutual assistance in the event of German aggression. The Soviet military mission held that, since the U.S.S.R. had no common border with Germany, it could render Britain, France and Poland assistance in the event of war only if Soviet troops were permitted to pass through Polish territory. The Polish Government, however, declared that it would not accept military assistance from the Soviet Union, thereby making it clear that it feared an accession of strength of the Soviet Union more than Hitter aggression. Poland's attitude was supported by both the British and the French missions.

In the course of the military negotiations the question also arose as to what armed forces the parties to the agreement were to put in the field immediately in the event of aggression. The British named a ridiculous figure, stating that they could put in the field five infantry divisions and one mechanized division. And this the British proposed at a time when the Soviet Union had declared that it was prepared to send into action against an aggressor 136 divisions, 5,000 medium and heavy guns, up to 10,000 tanks and whippets, over 5,000 war planes, etc. It will be seen from this how unserious was the attitude of the British Government toward the negotiations for a military agreement with the U.S.S.R.

The above-mentioned facts fully confirm the inescapable conclusion:

1. That throughout the negotiations the Soviet Government strove with the utmost patience to secure agreement with Britain and France for mutual assistance against an aggressor on a basis of equality and with the proviso that this mutual assistance would be really effective; in other words, that the signing of a political agreement would be accompanied by the signing of a military convention defining the extent, forms and time limits of assistance. For all preceding developments had made it abundantly clear that only such an agreement could be effective and could bring the Nazi aggressor to his senses, encouraged as he was by the fact that for many years he had been able to act with complete impunity and with the connivance of the Western Powers.

2. That it was fully evident from the behaviour of Britain and France in the negotiations that they had no thought of any serious agreement with the U.S.S.R., since British and French policy was pursuing other aims, aims which had nothing in common with the interests of peace and the struggle against aggression.

3. That it was the perfidious purpose of Anglo-French policy to make it clear to Hitler that the U.S.S.R. had no allies, that it was isolated, and that he could attack the U.S.S.R. without the risk of encountering resistance on the part of Britain and France.

In view of this it is not surprising that the Anglo-Franco-Soviet negotiations ended in failure.

Britain's Back-Stage Negotiations with Germany

There was, of course, nothing fortuitous about this failure. It was becoming obvious that the representatives of the Western Powers had planned the breakdown of the negotiations beforehand, as part of their double game. The fact was that, parallel with the open negotiations with the U.S.S.R., the British were clandestinely negotiating with Germany, and that they attached incomparably greater importance to the latter negotiations.

Whereas the primary purpose of the ruling circles of the Western Powers in their negotiations in Moscow was to lull public vigilance in their countries and to deceive the peoples who were being drawn into war, their negotiations with the Hitlerites were of an entirely different character.

The program of the Anglo-German negotiations was formulated plainly enough by British Foreign Secretary Halifax, who was making unambiguous overtures to Hitler Germany at the very time his subordinates were negotiating in Moscow. In a speech at a banquet of the Royal Institute of International Affairs on June 29, 1939, he declared his readiness to come to terms with Germany on all the problems "that are today causing the world anxiety." He said:

"In such a new atmosphere we could examine the colonial problem, the problem of raw materials, trade barriers, the issue of Lebensraum, the limitation of armaments, and any other issue that affects the lives of all European citizens." (Speeches on Foreign Policy, by Viscount Halifax, Oxford University Press, London, 1940, p.296.)

If we recall how the Conservative Daily Mail, which was closely associated with Halifax, interpreted the problem of Lebensraum as early as 1933, when it recommended the Hitlerites to wrest Lebensraum from the U.S.S.R., there can be not the slightest doubt as to what Halifax really meant. It was an open offer to Hitler Germany to come to terms on a division of the world and spheres of influence, an offer to settle all questions without the Soviet Union and chiefly at the expense of the Soviet Union.

In June 1939 British representatives had already inaugurated strictly confidential negotiations with Germany through Hitler's commissioner for the four-year plan, Wohltat, who was then in London. He had talks with Minister of Overseas Trade Hudson and Chamberlain's closest adviser, G. Wilson. The substance of those June negotiations is still buried in the secrecy of the diplomatic archives. But in July Wohltat paid another visit to London and the negotiations were resumed. The substance of this second round of negotiations is now known from captured German documents in the possession of the Soviet Government, which will shortly be made public.

Hudson and Wilson suggested to Wohltat, and later to the German Ambassador in London, Dirksen, that secret negotiations be started for a broad agreement, which was to include an agreement for a world-wide division of spheres of influence and the elimination of "deadly competition in common markets." It was envisaged that Germany would be allowed predominating influence in Southeastern Europe. In a report to the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs dated July 21, 1939, Dirksen stated that the program discussed by Wohltat and Wilson comprised political, military and economic issues. Among the political issues, along with a pact of non-aggression, special stress was laid on a pact of non-intervention, which was to provide for a "delimitation of Lebensraum between the Great Powers, particularly between Britain and Germany." ("Memorandum of German Ambassador to Britain, Dirksen, July 21, 1939"; Archives of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs.)

Surrender of Poland to Hitler

During the discussion of the questions involved in these two pacts, the British representatives promised that if the pacts were signed, Britain would withdraw the guarantees she had just given Poland.

The British were prepared, if an Anglo-German agreement were signed, to let the Germans settle the Danzig problem and the problem of the Polish Corridor with Poland alone, and undertook not to interfere in the settlement.

Furthermore, and this too is documentarily corroborated in the Dirksen reports shortly to be published, Wilson reaffirmed that if the above-mentioned pacts between Britain and Germany were signed, Britain would in fact abandon her policy of guarantees.

"Then Poland would be left, so to speak, alone, face to face with Germany," Dirksen comments in his report.

All this signified that, at a time when the ink with which Britain signed her guarantees to Poland had not yet dried, the rulers of Britain were prepared to surrender Poland to Hitler.

Furthermore, if the Anglo-German agreement had been concluded, the purpose which Britain and France had set themselves in starting the negotiations with the Soviet Union would have been achieved, and the possibility of expediting a clash between Germany and the U.S.S.R. would have been further facilitated.

Lastly, it was proposed to supplement the political agreement between Britain and Germany with an economic agreement, which was to include a secret deal on colonial questions, for the partition of raw materials and the division of markets, as well as for a big British loan to Germany.

The rulers of Britain were thus lured by the seductive picture of a firm agreement with Germany and the "canalization" of German aggression toward the East, against Poland, whom they had only just "guaranteed," and against the Soviet Union.

Is it then to be wondered that the slanderers and falsifiers of history are so careful to hush up and conceal these facts, which are of paramount importance to an understanding of the circumstances by virtue of which war was becoming inevitable?

By this time there could already be no doubt that Britain and France, far from seriously intending to undertake anything to prevent Hitler Germany from starting war, were doing everything in their power, by secret deals and agreements and by every possible artifice, to incite Hitler Germany against the Soviet Union.

U.S.S.R.'s Non-Aggression Pact with Germany

No counterfeiters can expunge from history or from the minds of the peoples the overriding fact that under these circumstances the Soviet Union was faced with the alternative:

Either, in its self-defence, to accept Germany's proposal for a pact of non-aggression, and thereby ensure the Soviet Union prolongation of peace for a certain period, which might be utilized to better prepare the force of the Soviet State for resistance to eventual aggression;

Or to reject Germany's proposal for a non-aggression pact, and thereby allow the provocateurs of war in the camp of the Western Powers to embroil the Soviet Union immediately in an armed conflict with Germany, at a time when the situation was utterly unfavourable to the Soviet Union, seeing that it would be completely isolated.

Under these circumstances, the Soviet Government was compelled to make its choice and conclude a non-aggression pact with Germany.

In the situation that had arisen this choice on the part of Soviet foreign policy was a wise and farsighted act. This step of the Soviet Government to a very large degree predetermined the favourable outcome of the second world war for the Soviet Union and all the freedom-loving peoples.

To assert that the conclusion of the pact with the Hitlerites formed part of the plan of Soviet foreign policy is a gross calumny. On the contrary, all the time the U.S.S.R. strove to secure an agreement with the Western non-aggressive states for the achievement of collective security, on a basis of equality, against the German and Italian aggressors. But there must be two parties to an agreement. And, whereas the U.S.S.R. insistently urged an agreement for combatting aggression, Britain and France systematically rejected it, preferring to pursue a policy of isolating the U.S.S.R., of conceding to the aggressors, of directing aggression toward the East, against the U.S.S.R. The United States of America, far from counteracting this fatal policy, backed it in every way. As to the American billionaires, they went on investing their capital in German heavy industry, helping the Germans to expand their war industries and thus supplying the arms for German aggression. It was as good as saying: "Go on, you Europeans, fight to your heart's content, and God be with you! Meanwhile we modest American billionaires will make fortunes out of your war by raking in hundreds of millions of dollars in superprofits."

The Best Possible Course


This being the state of affairs in Europe, the Soviet Union had naturally only one choice, which was to accept the German proposal for a pact. After all, it was the best of all available alternatives.

Just as in 1918, when, owing to the hostile policy of the Western Powers, the Soviet Union was forced to conclude the Peace of Brest-Litovsk with the Germans, so in 1939, twenty years after the Peace of Brest-Litovsk, the Soviet Union was compelled to conclude a pact with the Germans owing again to the hostile policy of Britain and France.

The slanderous claptrap that all the same the U.S.S.R. should not have agreed to conclude a pact with the Germans can only be regarded as ridiculous. Why was it right for Poland, who had Britain and France as allies, to conclude a non-aggression pact with the Germans in 1934, and not right for the Soviet Union, which was in a less favourable situation, to conclude a similar pact in 1939? Why was it right for Britain and France, who were the dominant force in Europe, to issue a joint declaration of non-aggression with the Germans in 1938, and not right for the Soviet Union, isolated as it was because of the hostile policy of Britain and France, to conclude a pact with the Germans? Is it not a fact that of all the non-aggressive Great Powers in Europe, the Soviet Union was the last to agree to a pact with the Germans?

Of course, the falsifiers of history and similar reactionaries are displeased with the fact that the Soviet Union was able to make good use of the Soviet-German pact to strengthen its defences; that it succeeded in shifting its frontiers far to the West and thus putting up a barrier to the unhampered eastward advance of German aggression; that Hitler's troops had to begin their Eastern offensive, not from the Narva-Minsk-Kiev line, but from a line hundreds of kilometres farther West; that the U.S.S.R. was not bled to death in its Patriotic War but emerged from the war victorious. But this displeasure can only be regarded as a manifestation of the impotent rage of bankrupt politicians.

The vicious displeasure of these gentlemen only serves to bear out the indubitable fact that the policy of the Soviet Union was and is a correct policy.


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